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Implications and Consequences of Post-Modern Philosophy
for Contemporary Transpersonal Studies
II. Georges Bataille’s Post-Nietzschean Secular Mysticism,
Phenomenology of Ecstatic States,
and Original Transpersonal Sociology
Harry Hunt

Brock University
Ontario, Canada
The writings of the French philosopher Georges Bataille (1897-1962) offer their own
contribution to the descriptive phenomenology of mystical and numinous states, as well as
a version of the modern secular or this-worldly mysticism variously anticipated by Jung and
Nietzsche, and a highly original sociology and social psychology of transpersonal experience,
influenced by Max Weber, that helps to open an area not widely developed in recent studies.
At the same time, the trauma and personal difficulties in Bataille’s life serve as a stark
example of the often distortive effects of spiritual metapathologies on inner development.
Bataille’s views of ecstatic states as entirely an immanent human capacity, in which he was
greatly influenced by Nietzsche, offer an opportunity to address larger issues of the “truth
value” of mystical states in contemporary transpersonal studies.
Keywords: numinous ecstasy, personal sovereignty, inner-worldly mysticism,
Being experience, Heidegger, self-referential incompleteness, Lakoff and Johnson
on metaphor, libidinal excess, projective identification, charisma, unus mundus
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he philosopher Georges Bataille (1897-1962)
was a highly original, yet controversial precursor
of contemporary transpersonal psychology, both
in terms of his original phenomenology and comparative
sociology of numinous experience, and in the persisting
ambiguity over what larger “truth value” to find in his
post-Nietzschean this-worldly mysticism as a naturalistic
human capacity.
Bataille’s understanding of the nature of ecstatic
experience also duplicates, over a ten year span in his own
development, a larger transition in 20th century “new age”
spirituality. The latter began with earlier advocacies of the
re-enchantment of an archaic mythic and ritual religiosity,
of the kind so intriguing at least initially to figures such
as the early Jung and Eliade (Hakl, 2013), and sometimes
appealing to a more right wing conservatism overlapping with
the Fascistic movements of the 1930s. Yet it ended with the
more liberal and individualistic focus on psychedelic drug
experience, visionary shamanism, and Eastern meditation

of the 1960s (Ellwood, 1999; Hakl, 2013). Bataille himself
went from his own founding of a secret ritual society in
the 1930s, based on his anthropological understanding
of tribal festival practices of Dionysian group sexuality,
animal sacrifice, and a fortunately unconsummated plan
for an elective human sacrifice, to a dramatic shift in 1940s
occupied France, where the collectivistic violence of Nazi
mythology had become obvious, to his development in
his major work Inner Experience (1954/1988) of an often
surreal and highly dramatized version of an individual
phenomenology of transformative ecstatic states. It was this
more individualized approach that he developed further in
Erotism (1957/1986) and the three volumes of The Accursed
Share (1967/1991, 1976/1993) into a sociology and social
psychology of what he saw as the creative secular “mystic”
of the future, potentially re-enchanting a secularized
and nihilistic modernity in a manner close to the earlier
concerns of the sociologist Max Weber (1922/1963) and
the later Jung (1959).
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Certainly the earlier Bataille is a cautionary tale,
and he lived his entire life in states of considerable inner
anguish and torment. This will be considered below,
both in terms of current transpersonal psychologies of
the “metapathologies” that can both drive and distort
spiritual experience, and in terms of the rather horrific
childhood which he never overcame, despite the
therapeutic help that allowed him to externalize some of
his suffering in initially anonymous pornographic novels
of considerable imagistic bizarreness. His childhood
was spent in helping with the home care of his slowly
dying father, who suffered the blindness, physical pain
and growing dementia of tertiary syphilis. Bataille
initially sought to overcome his deep guilt over he and
his mother abandoning the invalid father during their
evacuation from Rheims in World War I, through
seminary training for the priesthood. However, he soon
replaced any orthodox Catholicism with an orgiastic
sado-masochistic sexuality that even his more “libertine”
and surrealist circle regarded as “debauched,” and which
he only partially “sublimated” into his initial attempt at
a mythically elaborated cult (Suriya, 2002).
Despite a personal life of continuing instabilities,
Bataille, in addition to his original phenomenology
of mysticism, succeeded in formulating these more
collective aspects of numinous states into an original
sociology based on his own version of what W.R.
Bion (1962) and other depth-psychoanalysts (Searles,
1979) would later term “projective identification.” This
he understood not as a means of defending against
psychotic-like anxieties, but as a natural way that the
inner dimensions of an individual capacity for essential
or numinous experience are exteriorized onto personally
“inspiring” mythic, heroic, or spiritual figures in society
at large. Such exteriorizations can then allow a partial
and reflected re-incorporation of that capacity as one’s
own sense of an ecstatic “sovereignty” or Being—a
sociological version of Maslow (1962) and Almaas (1988)
on experiencing one’s own identity as Being itself.
In developing these themes in what follows
it will also appear that Bataille’s work touches on a
continuing ambiguity in contemporary transpersonal
studies over whether a “secular” mysticism can be fully
developed without some more transcendent attribution,
and whether a larger “truth value” of such experience
can be articulated on broadly naturalistic grounds
alone, without risking the incipient nihilism with which
Bataille himself continued to struggle.
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Bataille’s Secular Mysticism
n his major work, Inner Experience, Bataille
(1954/1988) sought to evoke and dramatize immediate
moment by moment consciousness, as understood by
Husserl and the early Heidegger, as intrinsically open to
the ecstatic experience of Being, which, with the early
Heidegger, he sees as the core of the “numinous” sense
of wonder, awe, and bliss that would be the experiential
basis of all religion (as also for Otto, 1917/1958).
Here something like classical “mystical experience” is
understood as latent within ordinary consciousness,
coming forward into full awareness to the extent that
our specifically human capacity for self awareness can
suspend all pragmatic “projects” and concentrate only
on its moment by moment flow. In this regard, Bataille’s
“inner experience” could be said to exemplify a secular
or this-worldly understanding of “ecstasy” as a natural
or inherent human capacity in the sense not only of
Nietzsche, his major influence, but also of James, Jung,
Maslow, and much of the later transpersonal psychology
of “higher states of consciousness.”
Bataille’s definition of ecstasy is unusually
broad. In addition to the great mystics, whom he
insists organized religion has falsely tamed with its
fixed concepts, ecstasy includes paroxysmal laughter,
eroticism, most specifically in its “transgressive” aspects,
all spontaneous intoxications of enthusiasm, festival
celebrations, and revolutionary violence, and the
aesthetics of dance, music, tragedy, and poetry. These
are all “effusions” that express “a keen sensitivity to the
present moment .... at the expense of every ... subsequent
possibility” (Bataille, 1976/1993, pp. 229-230).
This very breadth of definition has for
some commentators (Libertson, 1995) called into
question Bataille’s own use of the term “mystical.”
While Bataille seeks to separate that usage from all
confessional associations, he also terms it “man’s only
pure experience” (Bataille, 1957/1986, p. 238). Indeed,
the broadly “this worldly” or “aesthetic” expressions
he has in mind do fit with Max Weber’s (1922/1963)
category of the “inner-worldly” mysticisms. These are
best exemplified in Sufism and Taoism, as well as in
the Romanticism of Blake, Emerson, and Nietzsche
himself, and can be contrasted with the more “other
worldly” mysticisms of the East, medieval Catholicism,
and Plotinus, as well as with the this- and other- worldly
propheticisms of Judaism, Islam, and the Protestant
Reformation (see also Hunt, 2003). Very generally, the
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this-worldly mysticisms are centered on a capacity for
numinous experience understood as “immanent.” Its
“transcendent” expression is not to be found only or even
principally in a higher or supra-sensible realm but in the
contradictory multiplicities of everyday “becoming”—
the “thousand and one things” which form the outward
emanations and fullest possible expression of a felt source
or origin. If one then adds that this immanent sense of
source can also be understood as a naturalistic human
capacity or intuitive intelligence, and as such, “outside
the pale of specific religions” (Bataille, 1957/1986, p.
34), then we arrive at a category of “secular mysticism,”
as the “new age” variation of Weber’s original category
within a secularized material society. It is this version of
a this-worldly mysticism that Nietzsche, Bataille, and
aspects of contemporary transpersonal psychology can
be understood as articulating.
The further questions of whether such a
“humanistic” spirituality is fully realizable, and in
what sense it risks its own form, intended or not, of the
“nihilism” with which Bataille himself wrestled, will be
considered below.
Synonyms for Ecstasy
and the Necessity of a New “Negative Theology”
Inner Experience as Being
Bataille offers multiple synonyms for “ecstasy,”
in his own way extending a phenomenology of numinous
experience also reflected in the multiple transpersonal
dimensions of Otto (1917/1958), Laski (1961), and
Almaas (1986). Most central for Bataille is the sense
that these are experiences of Being, understood not as
concept but as an immediate felt sense made possible by
a specially intensified self awareness. Being for Bataille is
the experience of the inner form of the dawning of each
moment of consciousness, “continuously slipping away”
into an unrepresentable “nothingness”, such that while
its dawning is sensed as an inner feeling of creation, its
slipping away foreshadows a kind of “death”—a “wave of
life losing itself” (Bataille, 1954/1988, p. 118; 1976/1993,
p. 203).
Here Bataille shows an astonishing similarity
to the then unpublished early lectures of Heidegger,
as well as to his later manuscripts of the late 1930s.
Heidegger, influenced by Schleiermacher (see Hunt,
2012a), had initially understood mystical experience as
the “intensifying concentration” or “reflectance” of our
“self-aware existence” on the form of the “carry forward”

of the arising moment into “horizonal openness”—a self
aware “efflugence” of life itself (Heidegger, 1919/2008;
1919/2013). The later Heidegger (1938/1994; 1942/2013)
spoke in a way reminiscent of Rudolf Otto of Being as the
numinous sense of “wonder,” “awe,” and “astonishment”
that arises through sensing the very form of the unfolding
“event,” experienced as an emerging gift “flowing forth”
out of an unrepresentable “inceptionality.” That this
openness is also for Heidegger a “downgoing” and for
Bataille a “slipping away” led both to their preoccupation
with a felt affirmation of “nothingness” and “death” as
always implicit in numinous ecstatic states.1
Both Bataille and Heidegger independently
echoed William James (1912/1971; 1911/1996) on this
potential for “pure experience” as a background sense,
beneath the multiple, more specific “whatnesses” of
our experience, of an encompassing “thatness” of the
unfolding moment which resists or negates any fixed
formulation—and would be the core of mystical states.
This author has previously suggested that such experience
is based on the inner or abstract form of the organismic
“orientation response” to the very sense of an unknown
novelty ahead—here as the numinous sense of a “wholly
other” (Hunt, 1995).
Inner Experience as Intimacy
Ecstatic states entail a “pure intimacy” (Bataille,
1967/1991), such that the “discontinuities” of personal
identity are replaced by a unique “continuity” in which
barriers between self and other are eliminated (Bataille,
1957/1986). Here alone is true “communication”
possible. This can be most striking, of course, in shared
laughter and intense eroticism. But it is Bataille’s insight
that we are most connected to others in the most intense
states of religious and mystical consciousness, which we
have instead tended to understand as our most private
and inward moments, and so missing their evocative or
“charismatic” effects with and on others. In this regard
he was most directly influenced by the sociologist Emile
Durkheim (1912/1995) on a “collective consciousness”
best reflected in the shared “effervescence” of ritual and
religious symbolization. Bataille (1967/1991) says that
the sacred “things” of communal spiritual belief and
celebration “make visible on the outside that which is
really within” (p. 189), albeit with the continuous risk of
a secularization that substitutes the merely “outward” for
what was the intended “pure intimacy” of their earlier
evocations. While the present author has attempted to
expand elsewhere on this notion of human consciousness
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as intrinsically shared and collective (Hunt, 1995, 2010,
2011, 2012b), it remains the case, as will be pursued
below, that it was Bataillle who developed the first fully
original transpersonal sociology.
Inner Experience as Sovereignty
The ecstatic experience of Being is also what
Bataille (1967/1991) terms a “sovereign moment.” This
is the experience of an inherent or existential sovereignty
allowed by the pure “self consciousness” of mystical
ecstasy—“the return of Being to full and irreducible
sovereignty” as a “freedom” within the timelessness of
the unfolding moment (p. 189). Bataille’s “sovereignty”
of the person is very close to what Almaas (1988) has
termed “essential identity” or the “point”—in which
there is both an expansion and focus of one’s sense of
identity as Being itself. For Bataille this felt sense would
have been most available in the vision quests of huntergatherer shamanism, but it would undergo a progressive
displacement and projection caused by the endless tasks
and “servilities” demanded by more complex economies.
Projected forward and away from an immediate
ecstatic experience, it becomes the future supra-sensible
immortality or after-life that Nietzsche (1888/1954) so
forcefully rejected in Pauline Christianity, and Bataille
sees as a merely “pretended” deferment of the sovereignty
experience.
Bataille’s “Atheology”
Meister Eckhart, often cited by Bataille in Inner
Experience (1954/1988), says in one of his sermons:
The eye by which I see God is the same as the eye
by which God sees me. My eye and God’s eye are
one and the same...therefore whatever you get, you
get from yourself....God and I: we are one. (Eckhart,
fourteenth century/1941, pp. 82, 206, 244)
Taking this exclusively on the side of human experience,
we could say that Bataille, with Nietzsche, is interested
only in the epistemology of mystical experience as an
inner intuitive capacity, rather than in any ontology
of a God seeing us. Bataille goes much further than
Otto, James, or Jung in seeking to separate a felt core
of mystical experience from any traditional religious
schematization. God as concept and belief falsifies the
“inconceivable unknown” revealed in ecstasy. It “makes
us feel there was a subjectivity that necessarily carried
more weight than our own” (Bataille, 1976/1993, p.
417). Describing himself as “atheist” and “unbeliever,”
he rejects all “positive theology” that ends by having
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“inserted God into the chain of ends and means” that
lead to some “after-life” (Bataille, 1976/1993, p. 316).
Only the “vehemence” of a “negative theology,”
based on the intuition of a nondiscursive sense of Being,
can overcome the “endless servility” of “all traditional
dogma and belief.” Yet this will leave a very thin line
between Bataille’s version of a naturalistic transpersonal
spirituality and a kind of nihilism—and this he terms
his “atheology.”
Being is “ungraspable.” It is only “grasped” in
error; the error is not just easy ... it is the condition
of thought. God is nothingness. Being is nowhere.
(Bataille, 1976/1993, p. 317)
The meditative or spontaneous experience of
an open emptiness welling forth from “nothingness,” so
basic to Eckhart, Ibn Arabi, and the later Heidegger, has
traditionally appeared only at the most subtle and slowly
developed stages of traditional spiritual practice, whereas,
as will be outlined below, Bataille’s own experiences and
predominant understanding of ecstasy remained with its
more specifically intense and so more preliminary forms.
Perhaps accordingly, in his radical heterodoxy Bataille
often seems to pass over into a kind of Gnostic nihilism
and/or existential despair that has traditionally been
seen as the vulnerability or risk of a “negative theology”
(Altizer, 2003; Hunt, 2003, 2007). Indeed, it can become
difficult to separate a capacity to attune to the impalpable
unfolding moment as a timeless ecstasy from a sort of self
fulfilling cognitive illusion. Meanwhile, if Nietzsche’s
“death of God” releases the life-affirming ecstasy of
traditional spirituality as now entirely our own, it can
be difficult to see how that will have any “truth value”
beyond the merely pragmatic one Bataille scorned.
As will be addressed later, part of the
importance of Bataille today may be in his extreme
and pointed articulation of these genuine ambiguities
that remain largely implicit within a “human sciences”
transpersonalism or a contemporary “science of
consciousness.”
Bataille’s Existential Philosophy
of Human Nature
he key characteristic of human consciousness
for Bataille in Inner Experience is its intrinsic
“excess,” and a conjoined “anguish,” both as the result
of an imaginative symbolic capacity simultaneously
compelling us toward a “totality of the possible” which
we must also sense as impossible to attain. This “wish
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to be everything” can be temporarily fulfilled in ecstatic
states, but is always opposed to the contending and
contradictory multiplicities of all practical “projects”—
that “impossible combination of movements that destroy
one another” (Bataille, 1976/1993, p. 342). Human
experience is an “infinite turbulence...a headlong rush
forward...that loses any possibility of coming to a halt”
(Bataille, 1945/1992, pp. 182-184). In this sense Bataille
is advancing a theory of intrinsic human unbalance.
As a philosopher Bataille is best regarded as
transitional, linking a traditional metaphysics, that
would indeed posit such a single encompassing essence
of human nature, and a post-modern relativism that
would reject any single “totalizing account.” On the
one hand, for Bataille, there is “excess” as the essence
of human nature – explicitly patterned on the “will to
power” of Nietzsche, who Heidegger regarded as the last
great metaphysician of Western thought. While on the
other hand, that very excess results from the intrinsic
openness of our endlessly self referential consciousness
which must remain incomplete and partial. On this postmodern side of Bataille, our continuous “falling short” is
attested by the saving capacity for shared laughter.
The later Heidegger (1944/2011) suggested two
levels of discourse in major philosophers. First, there
is the philosopher’s “main thought,” which approaches
a would-be metaphysics to the extent that it posits a
“main trait” for all beings—a single all-encompassing
“whatness” of things. Second, there is the philosopher’s
“fundamental” or “ground” thought, most often implicit
or even occluded, which for Heidegger is a “poetized,”
necessarily metaphoric evocation of Being—which
with its felt sense of awe, wonder, and mystery is the
experiential origin of Otto’s sense of the numinous
(Heidegger, 1938/1994).
For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s (1888/1967)
“fundamental” thought is his “eternal recurrence of
the same,” which he described as his own personally
terrifying nihilistic challenge for yea-saying or ecstatic
affirmation by his creative “overman” of the future.
Bataille independently agreed with Heidegger here,
understanding “eternal recurrence” not as a literally
intended concept or theory, but as a spontaneous ecstatic
evocation and original schematization of the felt eternity
and timelessness of the numinous:
I imagine that Nietzsche had the experience of the
eternal return in a form which is properly mystical,
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confused with discursive representation....The object
of his vision—what made him laugh and tremble—
was not the return (and not even time), but what the
return laid bare, the impossible depth of things. ...
Perceiving it there is nothing left to do but ... lose
oneself in ecstasy, weep (Bataille, 1954/1988, pp. 27,
154)
It is important to note that Bataille’s version of Nietzsche
here is not that of the more analytic post-war attempts of
Kaufmann (1956) or Foucault (1977) to redeem Nietzsche
from unfair accusations of an influence on Fascism,
but the more personal Nietzsche of the Dionysian yeasaying – which did lead to multiple mythically inspired
“Nietzsche cults” earlier in the 20th century (Noll, 1994),
including that of Bataille.
Meanwhile, Nietzsche’s “main thought” and
what makes him the “last metaphysician” for Heidegger,
and this despite his major influence on the relativism and
perspectivalism of “post-modern” thought, is the “will
to power”—as the essence of not only humanity and
life, but, in the late notebooks of the physical universe
itself (Nietzsche, 1988/1967). Bataille’s version, and the
source of his own intellectual inspiration, is his doctrine
of “excess.” For Bataille this “excess” is not only the
essence of human consciousness but of all life. As with
Nietzsche, his key metaphor for this intrinsic excess
comes from the physical universe, in particular in the
unstinting and unreturned energy pouring forth from
the sun:
The origin and essence of our wealth are given in
the radiation of the sun, which dispenses energy
—wealth—without any return. The sun gives
without ever receiving. ... Living matter receives and
accumulates it...then radiates and squanders it. ... Its
extreme exuberance pours out in a movement always
bordering on explosion. (Bataille, 1967/1991, pp. 28,
29, 30)
In human life this potential excess presents a fundamental
problem. Where it cannot be used and fully absorbed
within the systems of society, and so must exceed those
limits, “it must be spent ... willingly or not, gloriously or
catastrophically” (Bataille, 1967/1991, p. 21).
In human economies there is always some
portion of this excess energy to be released. This is his
concept of the “accursed share.” The least destructive
social patterning of this necessary “wastage” Bataille
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locates in the Potlach tradition of hunter-gatherer
peoples, with its continuous competition in reciprocal
gift giving. Bataille’s intuition of the importance of
this gift-giving mandate as the fundamental means
of forestalling the corrosive effects of envy and social
hierarchy seems well attested by more recent work on
the sheer extremity of class distinctions in later primitive
kingships (Trigger, 2003; Bellah, 2011). For Bataille
the earlier balancing of Potlach traditions was lost in
more complex economies, with their “catastrophic”
expenditures in the form of widespread warfare, the
huge monuments of classical civilizations, and the “ritual
wastage” of human sacrifice. The organized religions of
primitive kingships became the ultimate justification
that these more complex societies gave to this necessary
“squandering,” as also reflected in the suspensions of
ordinary sexual and aggressive prohibitions in ritual
festivals. While on the societal level the most complete
balancing of this excess was already achieved in Potlach,
on the individual level its most pure expression is to be
found in mystical experience.
Bataille’s “Excess”
and Related Theories of Human Unbalance
ertainly from the perspective of a post-modern
relativism in which we are necessarily always
within any human nature we might seek to comprehend
objectively, there can be no proof of Bataille’s view of
a human essence of excess and unbalance. And this
must follow despite the deep intuitive unease about the
ultimate balance of the species shared by world religions
and mythologies. Yet there can equally be no disproof
either, and Bataille is in some very good company with
his own version of some major theories of a human
nature.
Freud and Jung on “Excessive Libido”
Both Freud (1917/1957) and Jung (1948/1960)
posited an “excessive libido” or “instinctual drivenness
“as following from our uniquely self-stimulating
imaginative capacity. Freud’s Id and Jung’s shadow
are not merely our inner “animalistic” selves, but a
heightened, perversely driven sexuality and aggression,
whose fantasy amalgams are unique to human beings.
For Jung this makes any core of our instinctual drives
unknowable, with their most direct experience as the
energy or “mana” of the numinous. While for Freud too,
the instincts are only knowable through their fantasy
elaborations, whose repressive containment causes them
to “ramify like a fungus” in an “uncanny” drivenness
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(Freud, 1915/1959). In Bataille’s terms this means that
human sexuality and aggression have an inherent inner
tendency that is automatically “transgressive,” which
is also his characterization of the full range of ecstatic
states—as always displacing an everyday profane order.
The social suppression of this imaginative drivenness
has traditionally been compensated by the energized
“sovereign transgressions” seen in mysticism, archaic
festivals, and for Bataille himself in the elaborated sadomasochism of De Sade and his own anonymous novels.
The Incompleteness of Self Reference
and Bataille’s “Blindspot”
Another explanation of the human striving
toward incompletable “totality” comes from the intrinsic
openness of our cognitive-symbolic self reference, which
we must attempt to fill with an endless, self transforming
creativity. Modern formulations here range from Mead’s
(1934) sense of an unknowable “I” at the core of all
experience, to Ricoeur (1984) on the unfillable blackholelike aporias of self, other, consciousness, and time
created by our open self reference, and Godel’s theorum
of the intrinsic inconsistency/incompleteness of any self
referring formal system (Bronowski, 1971).
Bataille’s version here is to posit the source of
our endlessly partial “projects” of mind and society
as necessarily incomplete attempts to fill an intrinsic
cognitive “blindspot”—analogous to the blindspot of
the eye except that it pushes forward into all attempts at
self understanding:
The [blindspot] absorbs one’s attention: it is no
longer the spot which loses itself in knowledge, but
knowledge which loses itself in it. ... Existence in
the end discloses the blindspot of understanding
and right away becomes completely absorbed in it
... What alone remains is circular agitation—which
does not exhaust itself in ecstasy and begins again
from it. (Bataille, 1954/1988, pp. 110-111)
The concept of God is the cognitive resultant of
the automatic attempt to fill this sense of open
incompleteness, while experientially only spontaneous
ecstasy can approach the felt sense of a “nondiscursive”
peace and temporary completeness that is not a “means”
to anything other than itself. What temporary balance
for us is possible comes from transpersonal experience.
Incommensurabilities of Person and Thing
Bataille also presents his own version of a theory
of human unbalance that the present author (Hunt, 2009)
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has also sought to develop in terms of the human symbolic
capacity as the creative driving together of two ultimately
incommensurate domains of cognitive intelligence—
“person knowing,” based on our capacity for empathy,
and “thing knowing,” as the manipulative intelligence of
tools and technology. It has been suggested that these were
preliminary but largely separate in the higher apes and early
hominids (Mithen, 1998), and that it is their intertwining
that defines the human symbolic capacity (Mithen, 1998;
Hunt, 2009). At their respective extremes, weighted first
on the side of thing intelligence, there is our capacity to
transform all things in nature, as well as people themselves,
in terms of human purposes. Everything becomes tool or
commodity. While this same creative fusion weighted on
the side of person knowing is reflected in the necessity,
developed independently by Jung (1944/1953), Asch
(1961), and most recently Lakoff and Johnson (1999), of
an anthropomorphically embodied physical metaphor
for the representation and full embodiment of our more
complex emotional experiences—including the loving
light of classical mystical experience (Hunt, 2006, 2009).
Yet persons are not things and things not
persons, so that their intertwining can never achieve
any final balanced synthesis. Indeed, certain of these
domain amalgams are especially unstable, and so become
the chronic sources of human excess, as specifically
reflected in slavery, torture, and warfare, where persons
are treated as objects of extreme physical manipulation,
or in the extremes of sorcery and magic where things are
given personal agency. Bataille focuses especially on the
tendency to treat the sovereign person as a commodity,
which he considers as the “primary alienation” of
humanity, prior even to the appearance of overt slavery or
human sacrifice. It is the danger already implicit in tool
use by a self-symbolizing creature. “Man, who makes use
of the tool, becomes a tool himself, he becomes himself an
object just as the tool is an object” (Bataille, 1976/1993,
p. 213). Complex economic development further degrades
our potential for a sovereignty of Being, in terms of our
becoming more and more complex “things of servile
use.” Indeed, if Bataille (1976/1993), foreshadowing
Foucault (1983), is correct, this unbalance becomes both
augmented and more subtlety pervasive in the elaborate
bureaucratization of institutional power and regulation
in modern capitalist economies, where persons are valued
only in terms of a quantitatively measureable utility.
Whereas the later Heidegger (1949/2012) saw
this commodification as the unique dilemma of modern

technology, Bataille understood it as already present at our
human beginnings, in the face of which archaic humanity
sought:
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to define alongside the world of practice, that is, the
profane world, a sacred world; alongside the man
more or less constrained to serve, a sovereign man;
alongside profane time, a sacred time. (Bataille,
1976/1993, p. 214)
Religion in general answered the desire to find himself,
to regain an intimacy that was always strangely lost.
(Bataille, 1967/1991, p. 129)
Yet the danger of religion was always of becoming its own
commodity, itself sanctioning more and more elaborate
forms of tool-like servility—which for Nietzsche became
his major critique of later Christianity. For Bataille, the
dilemma of Western modernity had become how to
liberate our person capacity for the conjoined qualities of
ecstasy as Being, sovereignty, and authentic intimacy, from
the dehumanizing “utilities” of a social order quantified in
terms of things.
Bataille on the History and Future of Religion
In his final work, the three-volume The Accursed
Share, Bataille (1967/1991; 1976/1993) addresses this
struggle between spirituality and the commodification
of the person by a further development of Max Weber
(1904/1958) on the Protestant ethic as the “inner spirit”
supporting early capitalism. For Bataille Protestant
Calvinism attempted for the middle classes what Marx
would later envision for a broader proletariat: to reconfer an individual sovereignty of Being through
newly sanctified motives for an increasing economic
productivity—motives ultimately doomed to ever
more secularization. In Calvinism the accumulation of
personal wealth became the outer sign of God’s grace,
but with the inevitable effect of “living less and less in
the present” (Bataille, 1967/1991, p. 133), and more and
more oriented toward a future sovereignty postponed into
a heavenly after-life. Meanwhile, Marxist communism
mandated an intensified economic productivity and rapid
industrialization in order to someday allow a new utopian
form of shared Being-ness. Marxism sought to finally
attain, with Bataille here quoting the early Marx, the
sense of “not being merely like a thing, but of being in a
sovereign manner” (Bataille, 1967/1991, p. 135)—which
had previously been conferred by an illusory God. In
both Protestantism and Marxism an intrinsic individual
autonomy of Being was inevitably lost to a permanently

projected and receding future—heavenly or earthly.
Both traditions for Bataille reflected a maximum point
of tension between a sacred presence and profane utility,
destined by the ever more complex servilities of modern
economic life to tilt permanently toward the latter.2
Bataille also developed his own version of Ernst
Troeltsch’s (1931/1992) prediction of a future thisworldly, secular mysticism, as the “secret religion” of the
educated middle classes—a “new age” spirituality in the
face of the radical secularization of a more traditionally
ethical-prophetic Judeo-Christian orientation (see also
Hunt, 2003). For Bataille such a potential shift toward
Weber’s inner-worldly mysticism would rest on a potential
“widespread upward adjustment of living standards,” in
which the sheer excesses of modern capitalism would
ultimately generate a version of the post-war Marshall Plan
for all peoples. Such a prosperity and expanded conditions
for leisure would create the outward conditions for a
renewed individual sovereignty more typical of traditional
shamanic peoples, and would encourage a widespread
“interiority” and openness to ecstasy. For Weber
(1922/1963) any widespread development of a pervasive
this-worldly mysticism would indeed require the degree
of individual freedom and material security that Bataille,
writing in the late 1950s, was anticipating. Bataille hoped
for an expanded equality of living standards, which was
indeed the initial promise of a post-war capitalism and
its potential globalization, such that a re-newed sense
of sovereign Being would allow “an ahistorical mode of
existence” or an “end of history” (Bataille, 1976/1993, p.
190), and a post-Nietzschian “cultivation of individual
excess.” Interestingly, with both the later Heidegger and
some contemporary transpersonalists, Bataille held that
his re-newed sovereign humanity would be both a return
to a shamanic “first beginning” before the “invention”
of God, and a “second beginning” for a more originary
ecstatic capacity understood as an essential part of new
expanded humanism. Something like this was also
envisioned by early psychedelic drug researchers such as
Leary (1968) and Grof (1972).3
Some Further Insights, Limitations,
and Selective Metapathologies
of Bataille on Ecstasy
“Intensity,” “Anguish,”
and the Rejection of Technique
Although Bataille clearly shows a conceptual
interest in the more subtle formless states of the developed
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Christian and Eastern mystics, his predominant language
for the spontaneous ecstasies he advocates, and his own
experiences in Inner Experience, center on words such as
“intensity,” “anguish,” “agitation,” “terror,” and “nausea.”
In this way he keeps his focus on what Evelyn Underhill
(1955) would regard as the preliminary or access levels
of “purgation,” well short of more unitive states. His
emphasis on a dimension of increasing intensity is also
reflected in his inclusion of paroxsymal laughter and erotic
transgression in his phenomenology of ecstasy. Initially at
least, he saw the formless states of Eastern meditation as a
kind of “religious torpor” (Bataille, 1954/1988, p. 183).
With this concentration on “intensity” goes a
related exclusive valuing of “spontaneity” and rejection
of all “project,” “ascesis” or technique. Thus for Bataille
both traditional systems of spiritual understanding and
their meditative techniques of sustained practice have the
unintended consequence of making ecstatic states into
a self-fulfilling project—an intended “thing.” This also
means that he rejects all drug use, without any apparent
realization of the more open-ended, less pre-programmed
properties of much psychedelic drug research (Grof, 1972).
The key seems to be that deliberate induction would
threaten spontaneity and freedom. Yet it is hard to see
how Bataille could then approach the more subtle stages
of unitive experience, with their admittedly paradoxical
dedication to “project” in techniques of deep meditation.
He also misses the varying degree of consensus among
Otto (1917/1958), Max Scheler (1923/1960), and Martin
Buber (1957) that the fuller forms of mystical experience
are always an emergent dialectic between spontaneous
numinous feeling and its schematization in terms of
cultural understanding—each leading and further
articulating the other (see also Hunt, 2012a).
Proust as This-Worldly Mystic of Presence
Whatever the limitations of Bataille’s
concentration on the more preliminary or access levels
of ecstasy, it seems also to have sensitized him to forms
of an emerging this-worldly mysticism generally not
recognized as such. In particular there is Bataille’s
(1954/1988) analysis of Proust’s spontaneous experiences
of re-lived remembrance as an ecstatic state. For Proust
(1927) the seemingly necessary separation of the sense
of semantic meaning conferred by imaginative memory
from immediate here and now perception means that
the latter lacks the sense of heightened significance that
follows from its later assimilation in memory. In turn
memory lacks the felt reality and impact of immediate
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existence. Proust discovered a spontaneous experiential
“doubling over” of the felt meaning of specific memory
and the immediacy of perceived event as the basis for his
The Past Recaptured. There he describes a sudden fullness of
remembrances re-lived in the here and now as a “timeless
joy,” and a “fragment of time in its pure state,” in which
“immediately the permanent essence of things, usually
concealed, is set free”—such that “liberated from the
order of time...the word ‘death’ could have no meaning”
(Proust, 1927, pp. 996, 1000).
Bataille identifies this as the same experience of
presence or Being central to mystical/ecstatic experience.
It would appear to be a version in states of remembrance
of the same enhancement of timeless presence described
in meditation. In more contemporary transpersonal
terms, Proust is describing a version of Maslow on “peak
experience” or Gurdjieff on the felt expansions of “selfremembering” in here and now situations, but for Proust
located in the full reliving of a significant past situation,
thus completing the experiential self awareness of its fully
felt presence lacking on the original occasion.4
For purposes of more recent comparison,
Proust was locating a potential transformation in lived
remembrance very similar to the transformation of
ordinary dream experience called lucid dreaming—the
realization that one is actually dreaming while the dream
continues. Just as it is easy to miss the fact that Proust is
speaking of much more than vivid memory, lucid dreaming
is often wrongly seen as simply a cognitive awakening
within the dream. Whereas the actual experience of
dream lucidity, and reason for its widespread interest,
can often include a sense of felt presence and bliss that
make its phenomenology akin to “peak experience” and
spontaneous “self remembering” (Hunt, 1989). Indeed
the capacity for lucid dreaming is explicitly cultivated as a
form of meditative realization in Buddhist and Vedantist
mysticism – a linkage also supported by the shared
phenomenological, cognitive, and neurophysiological
correlates of lucid dreaming and deep meditation (Hunt,
1989; Gackenbach & Bosveld, 1989; Gillespie, 1988).
The commonalities between Proust’s felt states of presence
in remembrance and the sense of Being in lucid dreams
support both as spontaneous meditation-like states.
Spiritual Metapathologies
in Bataille’s Life and Work
Bataille has both his own understanding and his
own vulnerability in terms of what Almaas (1988) and
Maslow (1971) have called the spiritual metapathologies

that can follow from disruptions of the ordinary
sense of self in mystical states—including grandiosity,
moral inversion, and/or emotional withdrawal. James
(1902) called these “theopathies.” Much in the hyperdramatization of Bataille’s writing and his personal life
(see below) suggests such unbalancing effects, while he
himself also warns against such risks. He points out
that the very transgressive eroticism he advocates risks
reducing the other to the status of a mere tool, deprived
of the very sovereignty he values. He also suggests
that Nietzsche’s “human sacrifice” of God risks the
megalomania of oneself becoming God, and so an even
greater solitude than that of more traditional mystics.
Bataille’s earlier involvement in a sacrificial pagan cult
certainly implies his own engulfment within what
Grof (1972) saw as the blocked “peri-natal matrices” of
violence, torture, and human sacrifice as preliminary to
any fuller transpersonal realization. The group members
were fortunate indeed that no one was willing to be the
actual executioner for the supposed sacrificial volunteer
(Suriya, 2002). By the time of the writing of Inner
Experience in the middle 1940s Bataille was able to say
that the importance of images of sacrificial death “should
not be understood in the literal sense...of really renewing
the savage practice” (Bataille, 1954/1986, p. 196).
He did not, however, distance himself from
what can be seen as the metapathology of his own
deliberate living out of the “moral evil” of a “transgressive
eroticism,” based on the sado-masochism of De Sade
reinterpreted as “mystical sovereignty.” In the same spirit
that James (1902) saw alcoholism as a distortive “poor
man’s mysticism,” the psycho-analyst Masud R. Khan in
his Alienation in Perversions (1979), also citing De Sade
as example, discussed a pattern in some schizoid clients
who, complaining of an absence of “feeling real” and as
its attempted cure, seek self-transforming “epiphanies”
or experiences of Being through risky sado-masochistic
sexual adventuring with strangers and in group orgies.
For Khan, this is based on the simultaneous attraction
to, and fear of, oblivion and “death” that also fascinated
Bataille. Khan described a degree of planning and ritual
pursuit in these clients that made their sexuality a kind
of “private religion” centered on this quasi-mystical
search for a way of fully feeling a sense of Being.
The distortive element in both Bataille’s eroticism
and in his understanding of traditional mysticism may
also be reflected in his suggestion that the “apathy” De
Sade advocated, as the emotional detachment needed for
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the most extreme sado-masochistic practices, is the same
as the “apathy” of the more subtle and formless mysticisms
(Bataille, 1954/1988). At the same time, he warned
that in any cultivating of the “ecstatic sovereignties”
of transgressive eroticism it will be important to limit
“possibly disastrous consequences” by an awareness of
one’s own limitations and tolerance (Bataille, 1957/1986,
p. 185). Bataille’s earlier life provides good reason for
these cautions, as well as some understanding of the
“irresistible excesses” with which he came to experiment.
The Personal Equation:
Bataille’s Childhood as Trauma and Source
Throughout Bataille’s childhood he, with
his mother and sister, helped to care for his invalided
slowly dying syphilitic father. The father’s suffering was
extreme. He was incontinent, staring in his blindness
unblinkingly into the sun, often writhing and screaming
in physical pain, and with hints of attempted sexual
molestations prior to his increasing tertiary dementia
(Suriya, 2002). Bataille seems to have felt a deep love
for this horrifically suffering father, and so also an
immense guilt after the family felt constrained to leave
him behind in the forced evacuation from Rheims
during World War I. This happened when Bataille was
seventeen, only to learn of his final death a year later.
It becomes understandable how the young orthodoxly
religious Bataille would identify his father’s suffering and
sacrificial abandonment with the crucifixion of Jesus, and
he later described his initial year of seminary training,
prior to its abrupt abandonment, as an “attempted
evasion” of his extreme guilt. This more traditional
attempt at religious sublimation was then followed by
an equally understandable and longer lasting conversion
to Nietzsche, who had also died in tertiary syphilitic
insanity, and the latter’s “beyond good and evil” of the
sovereign “overman.” During these initial years Bataille,
in apparent deep identification with the father, pursued
extremes of sado-masochistic sexuality in brothel orgies
that even his “libertine” friends among French surrealist
circles found “debauched.” He also experimented with
Russian roulette (Suriya, 2002).
Some degree of stabilization, and a lifelong
gratitude, came through his psychoanalytic therapy with
Adrien Borel, who, similarly to Otto Rank in Paris of
the 1920s (Lieberman, 1985), specialized in the relatively
unorthodox treatment of the highly creative. Bataille later
said “it changed me from being as absolutely obsessive as
I was into someone relatively viable,” (Suriya, p. 99), and
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it helped to replace his inhibited silence with others with
a rather forceful extraversion. Borel encouraged him to
partially exteriorize his sexual obsessions in a series of
initially anonymous pornographic novels (he worked as
a state librarian), beginning with The Story of the Eye and
culminating in his best known Blue of Noon. Much of
the imagery of these novels was apparently derived from
his father’s suffering, including notions of a pineal eye
in all persons capable of staring directly into the sun,
and of the sun itself as cosmic anus excreting light.
Borel also gave him a series of pictures of a Chinese
torture victim, with hair literally standing on end,
undergoing the “death of a hundred pieces,” one cut per
day followed by the photograph. Bataille later described
these photographs, with or without irony, as inspiring an
ecstasy of love and compassion, rather than any of the
sado-masochism with which we also know he continued
to engage (Bataille, 1954/1968). So perhaps there is in
all this a kind of sublimation, eventually as its own kind
of spirituality, which in his own anguish and guilt, a
seminary training could not address.
His secret society, Acéphale, had, apart from
their initial ambitions for an actual human sacrifice,
some similarity to other “Nietzsche cults” of the era
(Noll, 1994). These, sometimes also inspired by the
anarchism of Sorel (1919/1961), sought a re-enchantment
of secularized society by means of the often violent
imageries of pagan myth. The actual membership and
specific ritual and orgiastic activities of Bataille’s group
have remained secret, but surprisingly enough at least
its outer fringes included a young Jacques Lacan, later
one of the major innovators of modern psychoanalysis.
Some critics later saw a link with the similar use of myth
and ritual in early German Fascism, and Bataille, like
Jung at the same time (Ellwood, 1999), was certainly
fascinated by the propaganda methods and ritual rallies
of the National Socialists. However, Bataille soon came
to see Nazism, with its emphasis on the servitude and
subordination of the individual, as a deep falsification
of the personal freedom and ecstatic sovereignty sought
by his own group. By the mid 1940s his own “mystical”
path had become entirely individual.
That said, the personal impression he continued
to make on others was complex and sometimes
disconcerting. He is said to have had an especially
portentous, somewhat unctuous manner of speech,
described as having the “solemnity” of a prelate. Some
saw this, given his advocacy of sado-masochistic group
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sex, as “diabolical,” as if he were an “evil priest,” while
most who came to know him best saw this seriousness
as covering an exalted, often childlike, spontaneity,
and a tendency to be carried away by the emotions
of the moment (Suriya, 2002). Certainly, however,
his understanding of an ecstatic sexuality had less
to do with any would-be Dionysian yea-saying, but
rather reflected a more purgative inversion of values.
He described his sexuality, which he associates with a
deliberate immersion in “animal muck,” “putrification,”
and “anticipation of death” (Bataille, 1976/1993, p. 119),
as “this disgust that has become my delight” (p. 118).
He terms this his “hypermorality,” based on a “sanctity
of evil” that “reaches toward a pure sovereign intensity”
(Suriya, 2002, pp. 431-432). Again there is this form of
spirituality that insists on purgation and anguish, and
approaches a kind of Gnostic antinomian inversion of
values (see Hunt, 2003).
Whatever his original insights into a
contemporary this-worldly mysticism, Bataille’s version
of a Nietzschean yea-saying remained caught within his
own characterological issues, be they meta-pathological
or more overtly clinical. In a late interview Bataille
spoke of God’s “despair”: “a despair no human being
could have the power to imagine,” such that “to be God
is equivalent to torture” (Suriya, 2002, p. 483). The
necessity of God’s continuous assent to the very worst
of all that exists creates a despair that would justify God
in committing suicide. In this it is hard not to see the
suffering of both himself and his father, and a life spent
in its attempted spiritual redemption – some of that
genuine, some severely distortive.
It seems likely that without Borel there would
have been instead only an early death.
An Original Sociology
of Ecstatic Sovereignty
he most original element of Bataille on ecstasy,
only fully developed in his final writings The
Accursed Share and Erotism, comes with what he saw as
the intrinsically social aspect of ecstatic states—their
opening into the only genuine intimacy possible for
human beings. With Durkheim (1912/1961), states of
ecstatic Being are intrinsically a “collective consciousness”
(see also Hunt, 2010, 2011). They are “a contagious
subjectivity like an intimate tidal wave” communicated
by “sensible emotional contact” (Bataille, 1976/1993, p.
243). With Weber on charisma, as the social face of Otto’s
numinous, ecstatic states are for Bataille an intrinsic, if

often nascent, human capacity most readily projected
onto others—in religion onto God, later in more secular
contexts onto the “sovereign” leaders of different forms
of social order, and most recently onto the “stars” of mass
media. In Bataille’s secular spirituality of the future all
these projections must be taken back and re-owned as the
intrinsic existential right of each sovereign individual.
Here Bataille quotes Nietzsche from his late notebooks:
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“All the beauty and sublimely we have bestowed upon
real and imaginary things, I will reclaim as the property
and product of men.” To which Bataille adds: “We see
our own deep subjectivity into these imaginary others
... for which we have renounced the possibility of seeing
the magnificence in ourselves. ... There was nothing
in God or in the kings, that was not first in man.”
(Bataille, 1976/1993, pp. 375-376, 321)
With regard to acute psychotic states, considered
here as the inversion of mystical experience (Hunt, 1995,
2003, 2007), there is some evidence, supportive of Bataille
on the social projection of the numinous, of how intense
subjective states are not only readily projected onto
others, but actually induced in them—a phenomenon in
later object-relations psychoanalysis termed “projective
identification” (Bion, 1962). Harold F. Searles (1979),
in his long-term psychotherapy with both hospitalized
schizophrenic and borderline patients, described the
spontaneous appearance in his own awareness of what
he calls a “psychotic counter-transference,” in which he
comes to understand that his own bizarre involuntary
imagery and even delusional content normally alien
to himself, is actually indicative of inner states in his
patients which are unbearable to them, and so induced
instead in the empathic therapist. This would be a
version of Bataille’s “intimacy” of deep subjectivity,
appearing even within the ostensible emotional isolation
of schizophrenia. To the extent Searles could recognize
the ostensible source of these states and inwardly accept
them, the patients could gradually begin to report
these same experiences in themselves, now felt to be
more tolerable. W. R. Bion (1962) suggested that such
acceptance by the therapist allows these projected toxic
states to be inwardly “de-toxified” and so “returned” to a
self-aware ownership in the patient.
Searles (1979) concluded that often as children
such patients had unconsciously taken on the intolerable
anxieties of their near-psychotic parents, in part as an
automatically empathic attempt to make bearable or

“cure” the suffering of their loved parents—but doomed
to fail owing to the depth of the anxieties involved and
their own immaturity. One can generalize Searles’ model
to suggest that children high in creativity and imaginative
sensitivity are fated to take on the valuative crises of
their surroundings, initially of their parents and then
potentially as adults of the valuative dilemas of society
at large (Hunt, 2000). In tribal times these would have
been the children, often following the early death of a
parent, whose visions and dreams marked them as future
shamans (Eliade, 1964). Certainly in Bataille’s case we
see his massively overwhelming identification with the
slowly dying father and its later attempted alignment
with a redemptive post-Nietzschean spirituality.
The later Bataille intuited his own similar model
for the societal projection and reciprocal induction of
mystical-ecstatic experience. He suggests that after
the greater individual sovereignty of access to ecstatic
states in shamanic societies was gradually lost, more
complex social orders “worked” in part through the
projection of this capacity, still nascent within each
individual, onto powerful others defined as “sovereign.”
Meanwhile the latter’s often involuntary enactment of
this “excess” helped to compensate the average person for
the inevitable servilities of daily life. Indeed subsequent
anthropological research has shown a steady decline in
socially sanctioned individual access to trance experience
as social-economic complexity increases (Bourguignon,
1973). Bataille goes further to suggest that a projected
existential sovereignty and nascent ecstasy is then sensed
indirectly and by proxy through its mirrored reflections,
back from respected rulers and priests to its actual
source in the individual. “The possibility that any man
has of perceiving his own inner truth in others, and the
difficulty he has in perceiving it in himself, accounts
for [this] disarming aspect of sovereignty” (Bataille,
1976/1993, p. 247). Namely, that we unconsciously give
it away, and gain its pale reflection back from religious
leaders, kings, and now movie stars.
For Bion (1965) we cannot know our own Being
but only be it. Bataille is adding that we can both know
it and be it indirectly and partially, as reflected back to
us by certain significant others. It is here that Bataille
also anticipates the understanding of self awareness
developed by the psychoanalyst Winnicott (1971),
Lacan, and recent cognitive approaches to mirroring
(Meltzoff, 2002), in which what the developing infant
sees in the responsive faces of its caretakers is its own
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emotive reflection, which it then comes to own as its
personal sense of “self” through its identification with
them. Human self consciousness is thus based on the
partial re-owning of one’s own expressive states, as to
varying degrees they are reflected back to us by others.
For Bataille, quite apart from the political and
physical oppression involved, Feudal societies could
become more “livable” for the average person through
this embodied reflection of individual sovereignty back
from God and King, and from the magnificence of
medieval cathedrals—a sovereignty necessarily sacrificed
in the daily labor of the peasants. The latter could come
to an indirect sense of ecstatic presence by virtue of
imagining what it might be “like” to be a king, lord,
or priest, while this would in turn place unconscious
pressures on those with such “sovereign” status that they
may or may not have been able to embody without some
risk of paranoid grandiosity—a phenomenology well
documented by Canetti in his Crowds and Power (1966).
By extension, one could add that a
corresponding danger in “new age” spiritual movements
can appear when leaders lack the humility to recognize
their “holding” of their followers own incipient ecstatic
capacities, and also fail to accept the guidance they
gain by means of that very projection. Also, a spiritual
teacher may not be able to “hold” the more negative
inflations, despair, and deficiencies that they are also
asked to contain and de-toxify. A further consequence
of the social phenomenology Bataille lays bare occurs
where more overtly “pathological” gurus (Storr, 1996)
may not themselves be able to embody and feel what
their followers actually feel in their presence, as a sort
of “inversion” of the forms of group “empowerments”
based on genuine realizations in the teacher. Given the
subtlety of such relationships, perhaps we should take
figures such as Socrates or Jesus more at their word, and
without either our own or any attributed irony, when
they appear not to know, must ask others, or for a time
cannot fully accept, who they are actually becoming.
The gradual ownership, containment, and constructive
direction of such “excess” must have been all but overpowering.5
Bataille’s understanding of the social externalization and reflective identification with one’s own
capacity for multiple levels of numinous experience
may be open to further research in the context
of contemporary transpersonal studies. Although
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meditation in Buddhist, Sufi, Yogic, and related “new
age” practices is often solitary, there is also what Bataille
might understand as the “reciprocal echoing” of the
widely attested enhancement of meditative experience in
group settings and retreats. Similarly, there can be the
subtle guidance that comes from exposure to the outward
embodiment of realized states in advanced meditators
and teachers, where what is perceived in these others is
both the actual outer expression of the realization sought
and the reflected projection back of its nascent potential
and beginning within oneself. All human consciousness,
at its highest and most debased, and its ostensibly most
interior forms, is intrinsically social in its form, genesis,
and potential collectivity (see also Hunt, 2010).
Conclusions
By the end of the postumously published third
volume of The Accursed Share, Bataille seems to have
had a “project” after all, one that he attributes also to
Nietzsche, as the development of a naturalistically
understood form of individual mysticism, and one that
has at least some resonance to later developments in
transpersonal psychology. From Nietzsche he derives the
view that God is a projection of an intrinsically human
capacity for ecstasy and the sense of sovereign Being,
and that the task of our radically secularized era is to
take this actually redeeming and healing capacity back
as our own. Again, he quotes Nietzsche from his late
Notebooks:

It is this tendency for our thoroughly human capacity
for ecstatic experience to be carried and maintained as
if from outside that would be called into question in a
secular mysticism of the future.
The problem is that this projection of our Being
that Bataille traces historically may not be accidental or
somehow optional, but rather intrinsic. This may follow
from the permanent incompleteness of the self-referential
awareness underlying all symbolic intelligence, such that
it cannot encompass itself from within. This also fits
with the corresponding ubiquity of a “reflective” physical
metaphor that runs all through language, as necessary

for the self depiction of states of consciousness and all
complex feeling—following here the demonstrations
of Lakoff and Johnson (1999), Asch (1961), and the
later Jung (1944/1953). We need these outward mirrors
for the sustaining and representing of even everyday
emotionality. As social dialogical beings, our fullest
development of an immanent spiritual capacity may
correspondingly require its projection and outward
location, as beyond our phenomenal sense of “ourselves,”
to be reflected back in the maximally pervasive metaphors
from nature based on light, open space, and energy. This
would be the cognitive medium for ecstatic experience
(see also Hunt 1984, 1995, 2006).
A defining phenomenological characteristic of
the numinous is the sense that “it has you” not “you
having it.” Such experience in its fullest development is
felt as coming from something beyond. These experiences
are dialogically patterned and metaphorically structured.
Scientifically we may say they are “within,” but
phenomenologically they come from a larger Beingness
sensed as beyond/outside the ordinary sense of self, and
“reflected” back to us via metaphors of encompassing
light and spaciousness.
A related issue that Bataille’s naturalistic
“immanence” may not be able to resolve is the question of
what he calls his “atheology.” To what extent, if Heidegger
and Bataille are correct that the phenomenology
of human consciousness requires its own reflective
amplification that will be indistinguishable from the
general categories of religion and mysticism, must a
modern naturalism conclude that these forms are drawn
forward as a kind of cognitive trick or illusion in order
to fill temporarily the “blindspot” of our intrinsically
open and uncompletable self awareness? Spirituality, as
understood from Freud (1930/1961) to Persinger (1987)
then becomes a sort of “anxiety buffer” for the trap set
by our uncompletable self aware symbolic capacity. At
times something like this does seem to be Bataille’s own,
ultimately nihilistic, conclusion.
Against that may be two considerations – the
first immanent, the second perhaps something more.
With respect to the former, and as developed in more
detail elsewhere (Hunt, 2000, 2003; Wilber, 2000), there
is the view of mystical-ecstatic experiences as potential
markers of an abstract version of “formal operations”
within emotional/interpersonal intelligence. These
states do seem to support a genuine decentering from
an ego-centrism of self image and a radical equilibration
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“One must shatter the all; and [our] baptizing it [as]
God; take back what we have given to the unknown...
and give it back to what is nearest, what is ours.”
[Then Bataille:] This sums up the whole movement
of my thought....I would rediscover in [us] what was
enchanting in God. (Bataille, 1976/1993, pp. 321,
459).

of compassionate empathy toward others. Along these
lines of the functionality of spirituality as a fully mature
emotional intelligence, one could also call attention to
the small but convincing literature showing that classical
forms of mystical experience can be directly curative and
spontaneously remittive of acute psychotic states (Boisen
1936/1952; Bowers, 1974), and experimental studies
showing mystical states to be an accompanent/mediator
of individual creativity in the arts (Ayers, Beaton, &
Hunt, 1999; Michalica & Hunt, 2013).
On the side of “otherness” as necessary mirror
for transpersonal experience, as the author has developed
at greater length elsewhere (Hunt, 1995, 2006), the
metaphors of light, shining darkness, and energy
embodied in more developed mystical states are drawn
from the same perceptual matrix that is the source of
metaphors intrinsic to all forms of human thought –
humanistic, scientific, and even mathematical (Lakoff &
Nunez, 2000). Traditionally, in both classical civilizations
and in the elaborately metaphoric mythologies of tribal
peoples, this metaphoricity has allowed the coordination
of human microcosm and physical macrocosm, creating
the sense of “unus mundus” that enabled traditional
peoples to feel “at home” in the universe of their
understanding.
The fascination in both contemporary
consciousness studies (Atmanspacher & Primas, 2006)
and transpersonal psychology (Wilber, 1995) with the
seeming correspondences of the phenomenology of
consciousness and/or mystical states with aspects of the
spontaneity and indeterminism of quantum physics,
and the space/time relativities of physical cosmology,
may have less to do with mystics somehow directly
intuiting modern physics (Goswami, 1993), or with
attempts to use quantum mechanics to explain neuronal
activity (Hameroff, 2014)—whether the latter be seen
as promising or itself unintentionally projective (Hunt,
2001). Rather these parallels would follow from the
phenomenologies of consciousness and modern physics
both drawing common metaphors from the same
background matrix of ambient perception. The complex
patterning of perception in motile organisms will itself
mirror or resonate with the deeper dimensions of physical
reality by necessity of survival, and especially when
understood by Gibson (1979) as based on the intricate
flow gradients that generate the cross species space-times
of relativistic organismic movement (see Hunt, 1995,
2006).
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These correspondences, based on the drawing
out of shared metaphors for both consciousness and
physical science, will generate their own reciprocal
mirrors of human microcosm and physical macrocosm.
These will vary by culture and era, and Miller (2000)
and Arnheim (1969) have already demonstrated the
emergent parallels by the 1920s between modern
abstract art and contemporary physics. To return to
Bataille on his “excess” as the fundamental form of
both human and physical realities, if this is not deeply
resonant with recent formulations of an expansive
dark energy, universe creating quantum fluctuations in
nothingness generating the “big bang,” cosmic inflation,
multi-verses, and infinitely proliferating parallel
universes, it is not clear what would be. To dismiss such
correspondences as a sort of abstract anthropomorphism
assumes that a) we can ultimately avoid this, if even
mathematics itself is our own metaphor-based interior
language, b) that this correspondence was not already
part of these formulations in physics itself, and c) with
Heidegger (1942/2013), that we could ultimately know
what is or is not anthropomorphic anyway, in a universe
that somehow generated us who also reflect/represent it.
How with any certainty would we pull out of that circle
and finally distinguish between ourselves and cosmos if
our knowledge of both must be ultimately based on the
same root perceptual metaphors?
That said, is it somehow “wrong” to respond with
a sacred sense of awe, wonder, and gratitude, while using
their respective self-representing physical metaphors, to
the very existence of that universe? Are we required to
stay with Bataille on spirituality as entirely immanent,
and purely subjective? In his book A Universe from
Nothing (2012) the physicist Lawrence Krauss claims to
have demonstrated the final irrelevance of all religious
and spiritual response to this question of Being itself,
since the physics of quantum fluctuations within “what
is essentially nothing” would, on the grounds of physics
alone, have generated the “big bang.” He then states that
physics thereby renders all anthropormorphic spiritual
categories superceded, making the universe itself the
“ultimate free lunch” (Krauss, 2012, p. 150). What
seems utterly strange in this conclusion, especially given
the “negative theologies” also of such interest to Bataille,
is how or why the avowedly mundane metaphor of
“free lunch” for the creative emergence from “nothing,”
is somehow superior to Eckhart, Ibn Arabi, or the
later Heidegger on the emergence of Being as a “gift”
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and “grace”—felt as transcending and encompassing
humanity, and as occasion for an objective gratitude,
humility, and wonder.
If to a surprising degree the great mystics and
modern physics could be said to “see the same” in these
ways, it becomes a potentially rather significant matter
of existential and cultural choice whether we choose
“free lunch” or “grace”—or even, as Bataille himself
occasionally verged upon, and perhaps understandably
given his personal suffering, the sort of “Gnostic curse”
reflected in his suggestion that the efflugence of time
and creation out of Eckhart’s Godhead could be taken
as a manifestation of God’s “self-hatred” (Bataille,
1954/1988, pp. 102-103). Yet it does seem that some
form of “anthropomorphic” felt response to our creation
becomes inevitable—whether explicit in mysticism or
mostly tacit in physics. We find ourselves intrinsically
linked to some sense of what is “beyond” and
“encompassing,” and how we understand that, and the
extent we can allow our openness to it, becomes crucial
for how we live. “Grace” inspires a gratitude, while “free
lunch” implies a triviality.
Accordingly, Bataille’s own envisioning of a
fully developed understanding of ecstasy as an entirely
interior human capacity may have to fall short of the
potential he foresaw for a secular spirituality of the
future, at least to the extent it would also be felt only
in terms of our own subjectivity and inwardness. The
phenomenology of mystical-ecstatic experience seems
intrinsically pulled beyond that. However humanly
sovereign and even noble Bataille’s core understanding
of the numinous as human capacity aspired to be, the
experiences in question seem to have a broader “truth
value” than he was able to envision. Perhaps very much
with Nietzsche as his major influence, Bataille’s own
search for a unitive spiritual affirmation had to remain
more asserted than fully embodied. Given the burdens he
carried, what he did manage to achieve and foreshadow
remains deserving of both respect and empathy, and of
some further development of what remains novel and
unassimilated in his later work.

1. It was the situation of this ecstatic moment as
exteriorized and dramatized in both the experience
of the sacrificial victim and of the tribal observers
identifying with the victim about to be ritually

slaughtered that led Bataille to his fascination with
such practices.
2. Bataille also had his own way of extending Weber’s
(1922/1963) hints of a unique predisposition towards
a later secularization even in early Christianity, and
more than in any other world religion. For Weber
it would seem to be an ethical “on earth as it is in
heaven” and incarnation of a “son of man” that
would both blur and endanger the division between
sacred and profane that Eliade (1959) and Jung
(1938/1958) saw as central to a directly experiential
spirituality. Bataille (1957/1986), in turn, expresses
his own puzzlement over a Christian immortality
based on the preservation of a “discontinuous”
personhood, rather than as an amplification of the
“continuity” and unitive “intimacy” of mysticalecstatic experience. For Bataille the essence of a fully
felt spirituality would be some final release from
the endless “project” and demands of a mundane,
separate individuality.
3. Correspondingly, after the initial flowering of a “new
age” spirituality through the 1980s, reflecting the
anticipations of Troeltsch and Bataille, a Weberian
analysis of more recent economic pressures on the
once expanded middle classes would predict the
more reactive, prophetical fundamentalisms of
recent years, as more communal and with less of the
individuality central to mysticism. Meanwhile on
the side of a more populist this-worldly mysticism,
we find, in addition to continuing “new age”
tendencies, the more anarchic underground use
of opiates, barbituates, and methamphetamines as
ways of catching brief and ultimately self-destructive
flashes of specific qualities of numinous-uncanny
states, whose socio-cultural “set and setting”
unfortunately entail both a context and aftermath
of anomie and often despair (Hunt, 2003, 2013).
4. Bataille’s discovery of Proust as this-worldly
mystic is analogous to the realizations of Rank
(1936/1978), Balint (1932/1965), and Reich (1949)
that the psychoanalytic experience of “catharsis”
was not merely a repetition of the past, but in itself a
potential felt “rebirth,” “new beginning,” or “ecstatic
release” not part of the original memory, and with
features of “peak experience” that foreshadowed the
beginning of a more transpersonal phase of “selfrealization” often unrecognized by more traditional
psychotherapists.
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Notes

5. An irony of the present highly secularized era in
which children are often not exposed to any formal
spiritual traditions, and so are lacking any systematic
exteriorizations of ecstatic capacity into the suprasensible, is that they are thereby constrained into their
own more local “religion of the family.” This very
modern phenomenon is already embedded in Freud’s
theory of the “primal horde,” as what is widely seen as
his own projection of the middle class nuclear family,
with its oedipal patterning of the punishing father, onto
his fanciful account of early hominid evolution—then
to be used in turn as his “explanation” of the JudeoChristian God as divine father (Freud, 1939/1961).
In what I am referring to as the quasi-religion of
the secular family, and using Bataille’s model of the
external attribution of one’s own spiritual potential,
in the absence of any formal, socially endorsed
transcendent God, the young child will project the
entirety of its own nascent childlike but numinous
power, will, and compassion onto the now god-like
parents, and “worship” in them those same qualities.
Meanwhile the parents themselves will see their own
once potential numinous capacity into the actual
innocence and spontaneity of the child. The seeds of
nascent religious experience are thus communally held
within the family, making the mutual disillusionments
of adolescence all the worse, and without any more
overtly mythic externalized mirror and container for
what are very real energies of the human being. In the
case of Bataille, by contrast, more traditional religious
categories would at least have partly contained the
suffering of his father as its own crucifixion, while still
making the extremity of his larger than life status a
kind of God-man within the family.
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